Reporting behavior and transparency in European banks' country-by-country reports by Dutt, Verena K. et al.
DISCUSSION 
PAPER
/ /  V E R E N A  K .  D U T T,  K AT H A R I N A  N I C O L A Y, 
A N D  C H R I S T O P H  S P E N G E L
/ /  N O . 2 1 - 0 1 9  |  0 2 / 2 0 2 1
Reporting Behavior and 
 Transparency in European 
Banks’ Country-by-Country  
Reports
Reporting Behavior and Transparency in European Banks’ 
Country-by-Country Reports
Verena K. Dutt 
ZEW Mannheima 












The public CbCR requirement for EU financial institutions leaves leeway to the reporting firms 
as regards the calculating and presentation of the data. Based on a sample of CbCRs published 
by EU-headquartered multinational bank groups, we analyze the reporting behavior and the 
degree of transparency across the reports. We observe a large heterogeneity with respect to the 
place of publication of the CbCR, its content, the readability of the data tables as well as the list 
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United Kingdom and Germany being the most transparent. Inconsistencies in reporting inhibit 
the interpretability and the comparability of the data. We conclude that the specification of the 
underlying data source and of the applicable consolidation scope as well the establishment of 
uniform definitions of the reportable items are essential for an appropriate consideration of the 
reports by all addressees. Our analyses are particularly important in light of the proposal for a 
public CbCR for large multinational firms in the EU. 
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During the debate on base erosion and profit shifting by large multinational enterprises, the 
claim for the disclosure of certain tax-related data on a by-country basis, the so-called country-
by-country reporting (CbCR), has intensified. While the proposal for a public CbCR for all 
large multinational firms in the EU is still under discussion (European Commission, 2016; 
European Parliament, 2019; Council of the EU, 2019), several CbCR initiatives are already in 
place, allowing to draw lessons concerning their effectiveness. In particular, Article 89 of the 
Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV)1 introduced a public CbCR requirement for EU 
financial institutions for financial years 2014 onwards. The public availability of the reports is 
supposed to allow both the tax authorities and the general public to better assess whether banks 
are paying their “fair share of taxes” in the countries where they operate. However, the lack of 
clear and uniform guidelines on the definition and the presentation of the reportable items arises 
in reporting heterogeneity across Member States and bank groups, which impedes the 
interpretability and the comparability of the reports. Given that the CbCR obligation imposes 
additional direct and indirect costs (Dutt et al., 2020), it seems worthwhile to ensure that the 
different ways of calculating and presenting the information do not diminish the added value of 
CbCR. 
We analyze the reporting heterogeneity across CbCRs published by EU-headquartered 
multinational bank groups for financial years 2014-2016, considering in particular both the 
content of the reports, such as explanations on the underlying way of calculation or the 
provision of additional information, and the readability of the data. We shed more light on the 
                                                 
1 Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity 
of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 
2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, 
56(L 176), 338–436 (27 June 2013). 
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degree of transparency of the CbCRs, i.e. how transparently and comprehensively the data is 
presented and how accessible the information is for the addressees. Our analyses allow us to 
identify which open points inhibit the readability and the interpretability of the reports. We also 
determine relationships between the reporting behavior and bank characteristics, such as the 
headquarter country, the bank group size or the intensity of tax haven usage. Ultimately, we 
suggest a best practice approach on CbCR in order to improve the information content and the 
comparability of the reports. Our insights are particularly important in light of the ongoing 
political discussion on the introduction of a public CbCR for all multinational firms in the EU 
with revenues exceeding EUR 750 million (European Commission, 2016; European 
Parliament, 2019; Council of the EU, 2019). 
We rely on a dataset of CbCRs collected by Dutt, Nicolay et al. (2019) which contains 
CbCR data for multinational bank groups headquartered in the EU for the years 2014-2016. For 
each CbCR included in their dataset, we define and manually code variables that reflect the 
reporting behavior. They refer to the place of publication of the CbCR, the CbCR content, the 
readability of the tables containing the CbCR data and the list of entities that should be 
published together with the reportable items. A higher value of the variables implies more 
transparency or a better readability. Our analysis is threefold: First, we descriptively analyze 
the reporting heterogeneity across our sample of CbCRs, also considering differences between 
bank groups headquartered in different countries. Second, we aggregate single variables to 
transparency scores in order to identify bank groups and headquarter countries that are 
particularly (in-)transparent in certain dimensions. Third, we develop guidelines to avoid the 
inconsistencies in reporting identified above and to improve the effectiveness of CbCR. 
Our main findings are as follows. We observe that most bank groups prefer including the 
CbCR in their annual report over the publication as a separate document on their website. The 
majority of the reports contain measures that facilitate finding the data, such as the use of the 
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expression “CbCR” or a reference to the legal basis of the reporting requirement. Article 89 of 
the CRD IV does not specify the reportable items further. The following open points result in 
different ways of calculating the data. 
(1) Most CbCRs provide no information on their way of defining the “consolidated basis” 
on which the disclosure should be made. German bank groups exhibit the highest 
transparency with almost two third relying on the accounting consolidation scope. The 
consolidation scope of the applicable accounting standards is regularly broader than 
the prudential scope of consolidation and allows for a better comparison to the 
consolidated financial statements. 
(2) Information on the underlying data source and on the treatment of intra-group 
transactions is mostly missing in the CbCRs, which impedes the interpretability of the 
data both within the report (i.e. comparability of profits and taxes as well as across 
reported countries) and between different reports. From those bank groups that provide 
additional information, the majority claim to prepare the CbCR on the same basis as 
the consolidated financial statements. Intra-group transactions, though, are in most 
cases not eliminated. Only a fifth of the CbCRs in our sample contain a quantification 
of the differences between the CbCR data and the consolidated financial statements 
data. 
(3) Since “turnover” is not naturally part of the financial statements of financial 
institutions, we observe a wide variety of different expressions for reporting the 
“turnover” item. Some bank groups, in particular in Austria and France, report two 
turnover variables, which is in line with national provisions. More than half of the 




(4) As regards the number of employees on a full-time equivalent basis, differences among 
CbCRs arise with respect to the point in time to which the reported number refers (i.e. 
yearly average vs. at year-end or at the reporting date) and to the inclusion or exclusion 
of particular worker groups. Depending on the personnel structure, different ways of 
calculating the number of employees can result in substantially different reported 
figures. 
(5) Article 89 of the CRD IV does not specify how “tax on profit or loss” should be 
defined. The different possible understandings of the tax variable influence the 
conclusions that can be drawn from the variable itself as well as regarding the link 
between reported taxes and profits. Almost half of the CbCRs in our sample report at 
least one tax item of which the exact meaning is unclear. As some Member States 
prescribe the reporting of a specific tax variable, we observe systematic differences 
between headquarter countries. Bank groups headquartered in the United Kingdom 
consistently report tax paid, whereas French bank groups predominantly disclose both 
current and deferred tax expense. Bank groups from Sweden and Germany have a clear 
preference for the accounting tax expense. A fifth of the CbCRs report more than one 
tax item. 
Although the by-country data should be published separately for each jurisdiction where 
the institution has an establishment, some bank groups pool several countries into a single entry, 
which comes at the cost of transparency. However, the relative importance of these collective 
countries in terms of the number of employees and profit before tax is in most cases negligible. 
We also observe that some CbCRs contain information that goes beyond the requirements of 
the CRD IV, thus being particularly transparent. Examples are the provision of explanations 
that help to interpret the data, the reporting of additional variables as well as the inclusion of 
item totals and previous-year data. The readability of the tables containing the CbCR data is in 
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most cases satisfactory, i.e. most bank groups align numbers to the decimal point, use 
monospaced numbers, separate thousands by comma or dot and arrange countries in rows and 
items in columns. We regularly detect room for improvement as regards the table design and 
an additional visualization of the data. The list of subsidiaries and branches which should be 
published together with the CbCR data is often not included in the CbCR and frequently lacks 
information on branches. 
Since our variables are defined in such a way that a higher value implies more transparency 
or a better readability, we can add up the values of different variables in order to achieve an 
overall figure which reflects the degree of transparency across several variables. We construct 
three different transparency scores: The content score reflects the degree of transparency across 
the variables that relate to the CbCR content, i.e. the way of calculation of the reportable items 
and the provision of additional information. The readability score relates to the structure and 
presentation of the CbCR data tables. The overall score is composed of the content score and 
of the readability score and also takes into consideration the place of publication of both the 
CbCR and the list of entities. The scores are normalized to 100, whereby a score of 100 (0) 
indicates the highest (lowest) possible degree of transparency. We find that CbCRs published 
by bank groups headquartered in the United Kingdom and Germany achieve on average the 
highest overall scores, whereas Austrian bank groups perform worst on average. This effect is 
mainly driven by differences with respect to the CbCR content, while the variation of the 
readability of the data tables is low among the headquarter countries. Still, even for those bank 
groups that perform best in our analyses, the reporting behavior leaves room for improvements. 
We also observe that large bank groups and bank groups with a high share of tax havens disclose 
their activities in a comparatively transparent CbCR. 
We suggest guidelines on CbCR that aim to close the regulatory loopholes identified above 
in order to ensure a consistent interpretation of the reports across different bank groups and 
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countries, thus increasing the information content of CbCR. Above all, the specification of the 
underlying data source and of the applicable consolidation scope as well as the establishment 
of uniform definitions of the reportable items are indispensable. A standardized template, 
similar to the model template of the OECD (OECD, 2015, pp. 29–30), could further support the 
reader in processing the information and would facilitate comparisons across bank groups. 
Our study sheds more light on CbCR, notably on the informative value of the public CbCR 
requirement in the banking sector. A few recent studies analyze the effectiveness of Article 89 
of the CRD IV. They document that EU banks adapted their tax avoidance behavior to some 
extent (Joshi et al., 2020; Overesch & Wolff, 2020) and reduced their presence in tax havens 
(Eberhartinger et al., 2020) in response to CbCR. However, the findings of Dutt, Ludwig et al. 
(2019) suggest an overall zero response of the capital market to the introduction of the 
disclosure obligation. Empirical evidence on the information content of the published data itself 
is growing (Bouvatier et al., 2018; Brown et al., 2019; Dutt, Nicolay et al., 2019; Fatica & 
Gregori, 2020; Janský, 2020). The authors agree that the publicly available CbCR data of EU 
financial institutions reveals the extent of banks’ presence in tax havens and a misalignment 
between profits and employees. We complement prior literature investigating the CbCR key 
data itself by analyzing how transparently and comprehensively the information is presented. 
The way of preparing the reports is essential for a consistent interpretation of the data by the 
public and by tax authorities. Ultimately, we make an important contribution by identifying 
open points that diminish the added value and effectiveness of CbCR. 
Our findings are, at least partly, also generalizable to other CbCR initiatives, such as the 
confidential CbCR of the OECD that applies to large multinational firms (OECD, 2015). 
Although the OECD provides a model template (OECD, 2015, pp. 29–30), detailed instructions 
(e.g. OECD, 2015, pp. 31–35, 2019a, 2019b) and more specific items (e.g. differentiation 
between income tax paid and income tax accrued instead of “tax on profit or loss”), it also offers 
7 
 
leeway to the reporting firms. For instance, the underlying data source and the calculation of 
the number of employees are specified neither by the OECD nor by most of the implementing 
countries (Spengel et al., 2019). Still, the risk of misinterpretations due to the lack of 
standardized rules is attenuated by the fact that firms are encouraged to describe which 
calculation methods they use (OECD, 2015, p. 32). In addition, the data is only reported 
confidentially to the tax authorities, such that potentially wrong conclusions by the general 
public cannot occur. The current CbCR proposal for large EU multinationals (European 
Commission, 2016; European Parliament, 2019; Council of the EU, 2019), though, also 
foresees a publication of the data. Clear guidelines for preparing the reports are essential in 
order to make sure that the data can be considered appropriately by all addressees. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides information on the 
CbCR requirement for EU financial institutions and reviews prior literature related to our study. 
Section 3 describes the construction of our dataset. In Section 4, we analyze the CbC reporting 
behavior of European bank groups headquartered in different countries. Based on our findings, 
we develop a best practice approach on CbCR in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Background and prior literature 
2.1 The CbCR requirement for EU financial institutions 
After the financial crisis, the need for more transparency and stricter regulations for 
financial institutions increased. In that regard, the CRD IV, accompanied by the Capital 
Requirements Regulation (CRR),2 was adopted in June 2013. The package implements the 
Basel III standards, including for instance stricter requirements on capital, liquidity and 
                                                 
2 Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential 
requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, Official 
Journal of the European Union, 56(L 176), 1–337 (27 June 2013). 
8 
 
leverage and new provisions on corporate governance and remuneration, into EU law. 
Article 89 of the CRD IV provides for a public CbCR for EU credit institutions and investment 
firms.3 In light of the large public subsidies for the banking sector during the financial crisis, 
more transparency on banks’ worldwide activities should enable the public to assess whether 
the taxes paid in the different jurisdictions reflect real economic activity appropriately 
(European Commission, 2014, p. 3). The reporting obligation comprises the public disclosure 
of turnover, the number of employees, profit or loss before tax, tax on profit or loss and public 
subsidies received for every country in which the group operates. In addition, the institutions 
are required to list the name, geographical location and nature of activities of their subsidiaries 
and branches (referred to as “list of entities” in the following). EU-headquartered bank groups 
have to prepare a CbCR for the whole group, whereas groups headquartered in third countries 
only have to disclose data on their EU entities, including their subsidiaries and branches. After 
having been audited, the reports shall be published as an annex to the financial statements. The 
CbCR requirement is effective from 1 January 2015, i.e. the first disclosure should relate to 
financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2014.4 
                                                 
3 The CbCR requirement for EU financial institutions is one of the first CbCR initiatives. Section 1504 of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010 foresees a public disclosure requirement for 
firms in the extractive industries, but has not yet come into effect due to ongoing disagreement on the final rules 
to be issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (SEC, 2019). Similarly, under Chapter 10 of the 
EU Accounting Directive (Directive 2013/34/EU), large EU undertakings in the extractive industry are required 
to publicly disclose certain payments made to governments. For financial years starting on or after 1 January 2016, 
the OECD introduced a confidential CbCR vis-à-vis the tax authorities for multinational firms with consolidated 
revenues of at least EUR 750 million in the preceding year (OECD, 2015). The European Commission has 
developed a draft directive which resembles the OECD CbCR but provides for a public reporting (European 
Commission, 2016). The European Parliament and the Presidency of the Council of the European Union have 
brought forward several amendments and compromise proposals (e.g. European Parliament, 2019; Council of the 
EU, 2019), but a final agreement has not yet been reached. Finally, with effect from 1 January 2021, the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) has established a CbCR standard to which firms can voluntarily adhere (Global 
Sustainability Standards Board (GSSB), 2019). 
4 From 1 July 2014 to 1 January 2015, the information to be disclosed was limited to the name, geographical 
location and nature of activities of the institutions’ entities as well as to the amount of turnover and the number of 
employees. Global systemically important institutions (GSIIs), though, had to submit the complete information to 
the European Commission on a confidential basis. Based on this data, the European Commission, in cooperation 
with PricewaterhouseCoopers, conducted an assessment as regards potential negative economic consequences of 
a public disclosure (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014b). On 30 October 2014, the European Commission informed 
the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union on the outcome of its study and decided that the 
CbCR requirement should apply in full as originally foreseen (European Commission, 2014). 
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Being secondary law, the CRD IV must be transposed into the national laws of the EU 
Member States. Article 89 of the CRD IV lacks clear guidelines on the definition and the 
presentation of the reportable items. Aiming at a consistent interpretation of European 
legislation, the European Banking Authority (EBA) provides answers to questions submitted 
by interested and affected parties as regards the application or implementation of certain 
provisions. Though, these answers are not binding (EBA, 2019). Ultimately, the exact 
interpretation of the provisions set out in Article 89 of the CRD IV is up to the discretion of the 
Member States (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014a, p. 2), and – in case they do not provide further 
guidance either – up to the reporting banks’ discretion. Table 1 gives an overview of the 
transposition of different aspects that remain open in Article 89 of the CRD IV into the national 
laws of selected Member States,5 including clarifications provided by the EBA during the 
Question & Answer process. The most important similarities and differences across the 
Member States are highlighted in the following.6 
(1) While Article 89 of the CRD IV only states that the report shall be published as an 
annex to the financial statements, several countries offer more concrete options to the 
banks as to where to make their CbCR publicly available, e.g. as part of the annual 
report or as a separate document on the bank’s website (see also EBA, 2014b). 
(2) The CbCR should be prepared on a “consolidated basis”, whereby the wording of 
Article 89 of the CRD IV leaves open what consolidation scope should be used. The 
EBA recommends to use the prudential scope of consolidation as defined by the CRR, 
but provides that Member States can also require a broader consolidation scope (EBA, 
2014d). The latter alternative is followed by France (Art. L511-45 Code monétaire et 
                                                 
5 The selection is based on countries for which at least 15 CbCRs are included in our sample and where national 
laws and guidelines could be interpreted reliably. For other countries where we could only find single provisions 
(Austria, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden), these are shortly described in the following sections. 
6 See Section 4 for a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of different ways of defining and 
presenting the required information. 
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financier), Germany (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin), 2015) 
and the United Kingdom (HM Treasury, 2013b), which refer to the consolidation scope 
of the applicable accounting standards. 
(3) Article 89 of the CRD IV does not prescribe what data source should be used for the 
calculation of profit or loss before tax. In Italy (Circolare n. 285 del 17 dicembre 2013, 
Parte Prima, Titolo III, Capitolo 2) and the United Kingdom (HM Treasury, 2013a), 
this item shall be consistent with that in the institution’s income/ financial statements. 
According to the EBA, the CbCR data shall be presented “before adjustments for intra-
group cross-border transactions and other consolidated adjustments” (EBA, 2014c). 
Germany is the only country that provides further guidance in this regard, according to 
which the CbCR shall be prepared on a gross basis, whereby institutions can decide 
whether they consolidate intra-group transactions within countries (BaFin, 2015). 
(4) Turnover is not naturally part of banks’ financial statements and thus leaves room for 
interpretation. The EBA recommends that this item shall be in line with the institution’s 
financial statements and interpreted for instance as total net banking income, defined 
as “total net income before impairment and operating expenses, but including net 
interest income, net fees and commissions income, net trading income and other 
operating income” (EBA, 2014e). Germany (BaFin, 2015), the United Kingdom (HM 
Treasury, 2013a) and Italy (Circolare n. 285 del 17 dicembre 2013, Parte Prima, Titolo 
III, Capitolo 2) follow this definition. Austria (§ 64 Sec. 1 No. 18 lit. b 
Bankwesengesetz) and France (Art. L511-45 Code monétaire et financier) both 
explicitly demand two turnover variables (“Nettozinsertrag” and “Betriebserträge”; 
“produit net bancaire” and “chiffre d’affaires”), whereas Sweden only specifies that a 
net size shall be reported (FFFS 2008:25, Chapter 7, Section 4). 
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(5) As regards the number of employees on a full-time equivalent basis, Germany (BaFin, 
2015), the Netherlands (Art. 3 Besluit uitvoering publicatieverplichtingen richtlijn 
kapitaalvereisten), Sweden (FFFS 2008:25, Chapter 7, Section 4) and the United 
Kingdom (Statutory Instrument 2013 No. 3118) further specify that an average number 
should be reported. 
(6) The exact meaning of “tax on profit or loss” is not revealed in Article 89 of the 
CRD IV. The EBA recommends to report taxes both on a cash basis, i.e. taxes paid, 
and on an accrued basis, i.e. current tax expense without deferred taxes or provisions 
for uncertain tax liabilities (EBA, 2014a). Luxembourg (Art. 38-3 Loi du 5 avril 1993 
relative au secteur financier) and the United Kingdom (Statutory Instrument 2013 
No. 3118) prescribe the disclosure of (corporation) tax paid, while the accounting tax 
expense shall be disclosed in Germany (BaFin, 2015) and France (Art. L511-45 Code 
monétaire et financier), whereby the latter further distinguishes between current and 
deferred tax expense. Italy refers again to the taxes as reported in the income statement, 
i.e. the sum of current and deferred tax expense (Circolare n. 285 del 17 dicembre 2013, 
Parte Prima, Titolo III, Capitolo 2). 
(7) Beyond the explicit requirements of Article 89 of the CRD IV, the EBA recommends 
that the published data shall be reconciled with the consolidated financial statements if 
possible (EBA, 2014d). In the United Kingdom, institutions are encouraged to provide 
additional explanations and information that might help readers to understand the 
report (HM Treasury, 2013a). 
For the public CbCR requirement for EU financial institutions to be effective, it is essential 
that the reports can be considered appropriately by all addressees. The disclosure obligation is 
supposed to work via two main channels: First, the data shall direct tax authorities’ attention to 
issues that require further investigation such that abusive tax planning behavior can be detected 
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more efficiently. Second, public pressure should induce firms to refrain voluntarily from 
presumably aggressive tax sheltering and to pay taxes in proportion to real economic activity. 
The different ways of implementing the CbCR obligation, though, can result in reporting 
heterogeneity across Member States and bank groups, which can in turn impede the 
interpretability and the comparability of the reports. Ultimately, and notably in light of the 
additional direct and indirect costs that go along with the CbCR requirement (Dutt et al., 2020), 
the heterogeneous reporting behavior is likely to weaken the added value of CbCR. The public 
availability of the reports offers a unique research setting and allows to identify regulatory gaps 
that require further clarifications, such that the overall objective of CbCR, the increase in 
transparency, can be reliably achieved. 
2.2 Related literature 
We contribute to the literature on CbCR which is continuously growing due to the novelty 
of this transparency measure and the emergence of an increasing number of different CbCR 
concepts (see footnote 3). We differentiate between three strands of empirical literature on 
CbCR that can further be classified according to the different existing initiatives.7 
First, several studies analyze in how far affected firms reacted to CbCR and adapted their 
tax avoidance behavior and their real economic activities. With regard to Article 89 of the 
CRD IV, empirical evidence on its impact on banks’ overall level of tax avoidance is mixed. 
Overesch and Wolff (2020) find that EU-headquartered multinational banks with activities in 
European tax havens are particularly exposed to the new transparency measure and increase 
their effective tax rates after the introduction of CbCR compared to banks without tax haven 
operations and to different control groups not affected by the disclosure obligation. Joshi et al. 
                                                 
7 In additional, several normative studies discuss the pros and cons of CbCR, e.g. Cockfield and MacArthur (2015); 
Evers et al. (2017); Hanlon (2018); Dutt et al. (2020); Lagarden et al. (2020). 
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(2020) document a decline in income shifting by financial affiliates, but find that the magnitude 
of corporate tax avoidance at bank group level did not change materially. Concerning real 
effects, Eberhartinger et al. (2020) observe a reduction in European banks’ presence in tax 
havens, especially in so-called Dot Havens and tax havens where financial secrecy is high. With 
regard to the confidential CbCR for large multinational firms established by the OECD for 
financial years starting on or after 1 January 2016 (OECD, 2015), Hugger (2020) and Joshi 
(2020) document that the effective tax rates of firms subject to the disclosure requirement 
increase in response to the CbCR introduction and that the extent of profit shifting declines.8 
Hugger (2020) also observes that companies try to avoid the CbCR obligation by adjusting their 
revenues below the reporting threshold of EUR 750 million. De Simone and Olbert (2020) 
provide evidence that affected firms increase investments in tangible assets and employees in 
European countries with preferential tax regimes and reduce the number of subsidiaries and 
organizational complexity. 
Second, two event studies examine the reaction of the capital market to the increase in tax 
transparency by CbCR. Empirical results are inconclusive and depend on the underlying CbCR 
initiative. Johannesen and Larsen (2016) observe a significant decrease in firm value around 
two key dates in the legislative process that included a CbCR requirement for large EU 
undertakings in the extractive industry in the EU Accounting Directive. In contrast, the findings 
of Dutt, Ludwig et al. (2019) suggest a zero investor response to the decision to introduce a 
CbCR obligation for EU financial institutions. They find some evidence that negative reactions 
from the anticipation of reduced tax avoidance opportunities and positive reactions from an 
expected decline in information asymmetries between managers and shareholders offset each 
other on average. 
                                                 
8 Joshi (2020) only finds a decline in profit shifting from 2018 onwards. 
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Third, and most closely related to our study, several authors analyze the information 
content of CbCR. Descriptive analyses of the publicly available CbCR data of EU financial 
institutions reveal the extent of banks’ presence in tax havens as well as a misalignment between 
profits and employees in particular tax havens (Bouvatier et al., 2018; Brown et al., 2019; Dutt, 
Nicolay et al., 2019; Fatica & Gregori, 2020; Janský, 2020).9 Dutt, Nicolay et al. (2019) also 
show that CbCRs uncover a large amount of bank’s worldwide profits and employees compared 
to conventional databases. In the context of the confidential CbCR of the OECD, a few papers 
examine aggregated CbCR data of U.S. multinational companies.10 Garcia-Bernardo et al. 
(2019) find that the disconnect between profits and real economic activity is higher in countries 
with low effective tax rates and that the country coverage of CbCR data is superior to that of 
other available data sources. Clausing (2020a, 2020b) estimates a large scale of profit shifting 
based on U.S. CbCR data. Finally, Blouin and Robinson (2020) and Horst and Curatolo (2020) 
discuss in how far U.S. CbCR data contains a double counting of profits which might inflate 
profit shifting estimates. 
We complement prior literature analyzing the numerical CbCR information itself by 
focusing on how transparently and comprehensively the information is presented. For this 
purpose, we build on the dataset of CbCRs collected by Dutt, Nicolay et al. (2019) and add new 
variables to the key data contained therein which measure the reporting behavior of the bank 
groups. The way of calculating and presenting the data is essential for a consistent interpretation 
of the reports by its addressees. We make an important contribution by investigating which 
open points diminish the informative value of CbCR and impede its effectiveness and therefore 
require further clarifications. 
                                                 
9 Apart from academic studies, there are also studies prepared by non-governmental organizations or political 
groups, for instance Murphy (2015); Aubry et al. (2016); Aubry and Dauphin (2017). 





Our starting point is the dataset of CbCRs collected by Dutt, Nicolay et al. (2019). The 
authors conduct a Python programmed Google search based on both a list of multinational, EU-
headquartered bank groups derived from Bank Focus ownership data and typical expressions 
contained in CbCRs in several languages. They use textual analysis techniques to identify the 
relevant section in the downloaded PDFs that comprises the CbCR information.11 For each 
CbCR, they manually extract the key CbCR data (profit or loss before tax, number of 
employees, turnover and taxes) for each reported country as well as additionally relevant 
information (e.g. unit, currency). Their final sample includes (unbalanced) CbCR data for 114 
multinational bank groups headquartered in the EU for the years 2014-2016.12 This dataset 
forms the starting point for our analyses. We aggregate the dataset at bank group-year level, 
since we are interested in the CbCRs as a whole, not in the distribution of the data across the 
different reported countries. Table 2 shows the composition of the sample of CbCRs underlying 
our analyses by headquarter country and year. Overall, we consider 304 reports.13 CbCRs of 
bank groups headquartered in Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain constitute 
the largest part of the sample. 
In a next step, we define variables that reflect the reporting behavior in the CbCRs. They 
refer to the place of publication of the CbCR, the CbCR content, the readability of the tables 
containing the CbCR data and the list of entities that should be published together with the 
                                                 
11 See Dutt, Nicolay et al. (2019, pp. 14–16) for a detailed description of the data collection process. 
12 The CbCR requirement was effective from 1 January 2015. Dutt, Nicolay et al. (2019) conducted the data 
collection process in 2017. Hence, their sample covers the financial years 2014-2016. We believe that a longer 
time horizon would not significantly change our inferences, since exemplary inspections reveal that, over the three 
years considered, banks’ adjustments in presenting the CbCR data are overall only minor. 
13 The total number of CbCRs (304) is slightly smaller than the number of bank group-years (316) indicated in 
Dutt, Nicolay et al. (2019). The small discrepancy stems from the different underlying research questions. Dutt, 
Nicolay et al. (2019) focus on the information content of the CbCR data. In case a CbCR is not available for a 
distinct year, but the data is contained in the CbCR of the following year, the CbCR of the following year is used 
to collect data for both years, such that two bank group-years are recorded. In this study, though, we are interested 




reportable items. Columns 3 to 5 of Table 3 provide an overview of the variables included in 
our analyses. We differentiate between a maximum of four values per variable (i.e. 0 – 1 – 2 – 
– 3). Most variables, though, can take two values (e.g. 0 = “no”, 1 = “yes”). The variables are 
constructed in such a way that a higher value implies more transparency or a better readability. 
This ordering is essential for the score analysis conducted in Section 4.2 since it ensures that 
the values of different variables can be added up. The different values that a variable can take 
are also indicated in the legend of each figure in Section 4.1. The order of the bars in the figures 
reflects an increase in transparency.14 
For each CbCR, we manually code the variables along our definition. Some of the variables 
shown in Table 3 are derived from additional variables that are not numeric, but where we enter 
free text, which is subsequently converted into categories (e.g. turn_count, tax_count, 
item_add_count, other_ctry_count_desc). 
In Section 4.2, we also consider the relation between the reporting behavior and both the 
share of tax havens in the total number of reported countries and the total number of employees 
reported in the CbCR. These variables are calculated based on the original CbCR dataset at 
bank group-year-country level of Dutt, Nicolay et al. (2019). 
4 Analysis of European banks’ country-by-country reporting behavior 
4.1 Reporting heterogeneity 
In this section, we examine the reporting heterogeneity across our sample of CbCRs by 
conducting descriptive analyses. We focus on the place of publication of the CbCR, the CbCR 
content, the readability of the tables containing the CbCR data and the list of subsidiaries and 
                                                 
14 In Figure 1, Figure 9, Figure 11, Figure 14, Figure 16, Figure 18, Figure 19 and Figure 21, the order of the bars 
does not imply an increase in transparency. Instead, each bar reflects a “no” vs. “yes” decision (0 vs. 1). 
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branches. We also consider differences between bank groups headquartered in different 
countries and try to link our findings to country-specific particularities with regard to the 
transposition of Article 89 of the CRD IV into Member States’ national laws, as described in 
Section 2.1.15 
4.1.1. Place of publication 
According to Article 89 of the CRD IV, CbCRs shall be published as an annex to the 
financial statements. They are regularly made available to the public either by disclosure in the 
annual report or as a separate document on the bank’s website. Figure 1 reveals that most bank 
groups (77.30%) publish the CbCR as part of the annual report. Among those CbCRs that are 
published in the annual report, about one third (33.19%) are included in a separate chapter, i.e. 
the section containing the CbCR is listed in the table of contents of the annual report. However, 
there is a wide variety among the headquarter countries in our sample, with Italian bank groups 
exhibiting the highest share of CbCRs contained in a separate chapter (82.61%). Given the often 
extensive length of the annual report, information as to where to find the CbCR among the other 
financial and non-financial information provided in the annual report facilitates finding the data. 
For three quarter (75.66%) of the CbCRs, the annual report constitutes the only place of 
publication (see Figure 2). A quarter (24.34%) of the reports, in contrast, are published in a 
separate document, whereby rarely, both publication places are used in parallel. Bank groups 
from the United Kingdom have a slight preference for the publication of the CbCR in a separate 
document (62.50%); a few CbCRs are published as part of a larger tax report which includes 
additional information on the overall tax strategy of the group. A separate document is also 
common in Italy (41.03%) and Germany (35.71%). Article 89 of the CRD IV prescribes that 
                                                 
15 We only draw inferences on headquarter countries for which at least 15 CbCRs are included in our sample. 
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the CbCR data shall be audited. In case the CbCR is published in an own document, only some 
of these include a separate statement of the auditor. 
4.1.2. CbCR content 
In this section, we consider what information is provided in the report beyond the mere 
numbers. We take both qualitative and quantitative information into account, such as additional 
explanations on the calculation of the data or the inclusion of supplementary items that go 
beyond the requirements of the CRD IV. 
As displayed in Figure 3, more than half of the CbCRs (56.58%) include the literal 
expression of “CbCR” or equivalent terms, which helps to find the report. In Spain, Article 87 
of Law 10/2014 specifies that the CbCR shall be called “informe bancario anual” (annual 
banking report), which is consistent with our observations.16 While 23.36% of the reports 
provide no explanation on the legal basis of the CbCR, 28.62% (9.21%) refer to the national 
legal rules (the CRD IV) (see Figure 4). In 38.82% of the cases, a reference to both national 
law and the CRD IV is provided, which is particularly common in Spain and Germany. Again, 
such a reference supports the reader of the document in identifying the CbCR data. 
The CbCR should be prepared on a “consolidated basis”, which could relate to either the 
accounting or the (usually narrower) prudential consolidation scope (EBA, 2014d). Figure 5 
shows that the vast majority of the CbCRs (80.26%) contain no information on the underlying 
scope of consolidation. 3.29% (only CbCRs from France) state that “consolidated entities” are 
included, without providing further details. Since the CbCR is regularly part of the annual report 
(see above), this statement presumably refers to the consolidation scope of the applicable 
                                                 
16 However, we do not consider the expression „informe bancario anual“ as synonym for „CbCR“ since it is not 
specific enough to find the CbCR data without knowledge of the Spanish regulation. A term which we treat 




accounting standards. This understanding is also consistent with the provisions of Article L511-
45 of the “Code monétaire et financier” in France. 2.30% of the CbCRs (only from Germany) 
state to use the prudential consolidation scope, whereas an explicit reference to the accounting 
consolidation scope is made in 14.14% of the cases. Germany exhibits by far the highest 
transparency (only 25% of the reports provide no information). With almost two third (64.29%) 
relying on the accounting consolidation scope, the majority of the German bank groups are in 
line with the guidelines of the BaFin (BaFin, 2015). 
Article 89 of the CRD IV does not specify which data source should be used for the 
calculation of the reportable items and in how far profits from intra-group transactions should 
be eliminated. Both single and consolidated financial statements are conceivable data sources. 
These alternatives contain important differences. If consolidated financial statements are used, 
consolidated profits/ losses and turnover must be allocated to different countries. The sum of 
the country profits reported in the CbCR should thus correspond to the total profit at group level 
reported in the consolidated financial statements (Evers & Hundsdoerfer, 2014, p. 12). Such an 
apportionment, though, is arbitrary since total profits are affected by synergy effects as well as 
by non-feasible internal and external factors and therefore cannot be allocated to distinct 
locations based on simple key figures (Evers & Hundsdoerfer, 2014, pp. 12–13, 23). If, in 
contrast, single financial statements are considered, the profits/ losses and turnover of the 
group’s entities would just have to be added up by country. In consolidated financial statements, 
income and expenses from intra-group transactions are netted out, such that the overall profit 
remains unaffected (Evers et al., 2017, p. 7). However, taxes are regularly determined on the 
basis of single financial statements including profits from intra-groups transactions. Thus, the 
link between reported profits and taxes per country is likely to be distorted and offers room for 
misinterpretations (Evers & Hundsdoerfer, 2014, p. 12; Grotherr, 2016, p. 711). In addition, 
profit shifting by means of transfer pricing or intra-group financing is not visible (Evers et al., 
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2017, p. 7). By contrast, single financial statements contain profits from intra-group 
transactions. Still, they would at best provide rough indications for profit shifting because the 
by-country data does not provide details on the intercompany transactions, such as on their 
source or direction (Evers et al., 2017, p. 7). Although reported profits and taxes per country 
match better than on the basis of consolidated financial statements (Grotherr, 2016, p. 711), 
discrepancies between financial and tax accounting can also result in a misleading picture 
(Evers et al., 2017, p. 7). Lastly, single financial statements are regularly based on local 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) which might differ between jurisdictions, 
thus impeding the cross-country comparability of the data (Grotherr, 2016, p. 712; Evers et al., 
2017, p. 7). For consolidated financial statements, International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) are becoming more and more common, but discrepancies between CbCRs prepared by 
different groups might arise as well unless all countries oblige firms to rely exclusively on IFRS 
(Spengel et al., 2019, p. 579). Still, at least within the same CbCR, the data is better comparable 
across reported countries. 
Figure 6 shows that information on the underlying data source is mostly missing in the 
CbCRs. The data source used for the by-country calculation of turnover is more often revealed 
(35.20% of the CbCRs) than for the determination of profit or loss before tax (21.62% of the 
cases). A potential reason is that the notion of turnover itself requires further explanations as it 
is not naturally part of the financial statements of financial institutions (see section below). 
German and Spanish bank groups exhibit the highest transparency. From those bank groups 
that provide additional information on the underlying data source, the majority claim to prepare 
the CbCR on the same basis as the consolidated financial statements. Most bank groups also 
remain intransparent on how they treat intra-group transactions (see Figure 7). German bank 
groups are the most transparent, with a clear preference for no elimination of intra-group 
transactions (49.09% for profit before tax, 69.64% for turnover), thereby following the 
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recommendation of the BaFin to report the data on a gross basis (BaFin, 2015). We rarely 
observe the elimination of all intra-group transactions in Italy, the United Kingdom and 
Germany. An elimination of transactions between entities in the same country while preserving 
cross-border intra-group transactions (EBA, 2014c) is explicitly made by a small portion of 
bank groups headquartered in the United Kingdom and Germany. A direct comparison of Figure 
6 and Figure 7 reveals that caution should be warranted when taking the statements in the 
reports literally: While consolidated financial statements are the preferred source of data, no 
elimination is the most favored treatment of intra-group transactions, which constitutes a 
contradiction (see description above). Hence, statements such as “the data is prepared on the 
same basis as the consolidated financial statements” do not imply an exact equaling of the data 
from the CbCR and the consolidated financial statements because additional adjustments might 
have been made when splitting the overall result to individual countries. The EBA recommends 
that the CbCR data shall be reconciled with the consolidated financial statements (EBA, 2014d). 
Only few CbCRs state that the CbCR data and the consolidated financial statements data are 
compatible (3.04%) respectively not compatible (2.03%) (see Figure 8). A fifth (22.30%) of the 
CbCRs in our sample contain a quantification of the differences between the two types of 
information disclosed. Especially bank groups headquartered in Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and Italy prepare such a reconciliation. Some bank groups provide additional explanations on 
the origin of the difference between the sum of the country profits in the CbCR and the overall 
profit in the consolidated financial statements. Common reasons are adjustments with respect 
to intra-group transactions and dividend payments.17 
                                                 
17 Since dividend distributions are not deductible from income, the inclusion of received intra-group dividends in 
the reported profit before tax results in a double counting of the dividend income. In particular with respect to 
jurisdictions where holding companies are located, a distorted picture on the amount of profits before tax might 
thus arise (Spengel et al., 2019, p. 580). See also Horst and Curatolo (2020) and Blouin and Robinson (2020) for 
a discussion of this double counting problem with respect to aggregate CbCR data of U.S. multinationals. As 
regards the CbCR requirement set out in Action 13 of the OECD’s Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) (OECD, 2015), the OECD has recently clarified that dividend payments received from other group 
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The notion of “turnover” is not naturally part of the financial statements of financial 
institutions. The EBA clarifies that this item shall be in line with the institution’s financial 
statements and interpreted for instance as total net banking income, defined as “total net income 
before impairment and operating expenses, but including net interest income, net fees and 
commissions income, net trading income and other operating income” (EBA, 2014e). We 
observe a wide variety of different expressions for reporting the “turnover” item, which are 
displayed in Figure 9. Almost half of the bank groups (48.36%) employ literally the notion of 
“turnover” (notwithstanding differences in language and spelling). Other expressions that 
regularly appear (between 6.25% and 13.49% of the cases) are “(total) operating income”, 
“(sales/ net) revenue(s)”, “(total/ gross) income/ margin”, “net banking income”, “business 
volume” and “net interest income” (see the notes to Figure 9 for variants in different languages 
and spelling). In Austria, § 64 Sec. 1 No. 18 lit. b Bankwesengesetz goes beyond the 
requirements of the CRD IV and prescribes the reporting of two different turnover items, 
namely “Nettozinsertrag” (net interest income) and “Betriebserträge” (operating income). In 
France, Article L511-45 of the “Code monétaire et financier” demands two turnover variables 
as well, i.e. "produit net bancaire" (net banking income) and "chiffre d'affaires" (turnover). 
Indeed, we observe that 82.35% of the Austrian and 17.95% of the French bank groups in our 
sample report two different turnover variables (see Figure 10). A few bank groups in Sweden 
even disclose three or more turnover items. The expression used for turnover is often not 
concrete enough to gain a thorough understanding of what is actually measured by this variable, 
in particular if the notion “turnover” itself is employed. More than half of the CbCRs (57.57%) 
provide therefore additional explanations on the composition of the reported turnover item(s), 
for instance which sub-items are included in the variable (see Figure 11). Transparency is 
highest in Germany and Spain and lowest in the Netherlands, France and Austria. Still, 
                                                 
members should be excluded from profit or loss before tax (OECD, 2019b, p. 13). Article 89 of the CRD IV, 
though, does not prescribe how intra-group dividends should be treated. 
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additional definitions are dispensable if the turnover expression is sufficiently precise, as it is 
regularly the case in Austria and France, for instance. 
Article 89 of the CRD IV specifies that the number of employees shall be reported on a 
full-time equivalent basis, without providing more detailed instructions on the exact calculation. 
The lack of clear guidelines results in reporting heterogeneity with regard to two main aspects. 
First, the number of employees could either be calculated as an average over time or at a specific 
point in time, i.e. at year-end or at the reporting date. Depending on the magnitude of staff 
fluctuations during the year, these alternatives can give rise to substantially different reported 
numbers. As displayed in Figure 12, almost half of the CbCRs in our sample (46.38%) contain 
no additional information on the point in time to which the reported employee figure refers. 
Bank groups headquartered in Italy are the least transparent, with only 12.82% specifying the 
way of calculation. Transparency is highest in the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands 
and Spain. Among those bank groups that provide explanations, about two third (35.53% of all 
reports) report an average over time, whereas about one third (17.76% of all reports) consider 
the number of employees at a specific point in time; only a minority of bank groups from the 
United Kingdom report both. Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom have 
laws or guidelines in place that ask for an average number, which is consistent with our 
observations. Second, there is uncertainty as to in how far particular worker groups should be 
considered, for instance sub-contractors, interns, apprentices or employees on parental leave. 
15.46% of the CbCRs include more specific explanations on the calculation of the number of 
employees that go beyond information on the point in time (average vs. specific point), such as 
the inclusion or exclusion of certain worker groups (see Figure 11). Italy is the country with the 




Article 89 of the CRD IV does not prescribe how “tax on profit or loss” should be defined, 
which leaves room for interpretation. The EBA recommends to report taxes both on a cash 
basis, i.e. taxes paid, and on an accrued basis, i.e. current tax expense without deferred taxes or 
provisions for uncertain tax liabilities (EBA, 2014a). Several Member States, however, 
prescribe the reporting of one or the other tax variable. As such, Luxembourg and the United 
Kingdom demand the disclosure of (corporation) tax paid, while the accounting tax expense 
shall be disclosed in Germany, Italy and France, whereby the latter further distinguishes 
between current and deferred tax expense. Depending on the reported tax variable, different 
considerations have to be made when interpreting the CbCR data. Taxes paid also include 
payments for past or future periods and withholding taxes paid by other group members and 
therefore do not adequately reflect the country-specific tax burden in a certain year. In this 
regard, income tax accrued, excluding deferred taxes, would be a more suitable measure 
(Grotherr, 2016, p. 713). However, due to differences between financial and tax accounting, the 
tax base often differs temporarily or permanently from the profit in the financial statements. 
Hence, the link between profits and taxes reported in the CbCR would again be distorted 
(Grotherr, 2016, p. 713). If, in contrast, the sum of current and deferred tax expense is disclosed 
– without a further split into its components – reported profits and taxes would match better, 
but no information would be provided on the amount of tax that actually accrued in the 
respective year. The conflict between the advantages and drawbacks of different tax variables 
could be partly solved by reporting several variables. However, the vast majority of the CbCRs 
in our sample (80.26%) report exactly one tax item (see Figure 13). The reporting of two or 
three tax variables is particularly common in France, which is in line with Article L511-45 of 
the “Code monétaire et financier” requiring a distinction between current and deferred taxes. A 
few bank groups, mainly in Spain and Italy, only report turnover and employees, thus not fully 
complying with the requirements of the CRD IV. Some bank groups in the United Kingdom, in 
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contrast, even report four or more tax variables on a voluntary basis; for instance, they also 
disclose value added taxes, payroll taxes or bank levy paid. Figure 14 displays the relative 
frequencies of different tax variables included in the CbCR. Almost half of the CbCRs in our 
sample (48.99%) report at least one tax item of which the exact meaning is unclear, i.e. just 
labelled “taxes” or similar. 24.66% of the CbCRs include the sum of current and deferred tax 
expense. 19.26% of the CbCRs report tax paid, which is only common in the United Kingdom, 
Spain, Austria and Sweden. 16.55% and 9.80% of the reports contain data on current tax 
expense and deferred tax expense, respectively, whereby the latter is only observable in France 
and Belgium. The highest transparency on the definition of the tax variables can be found in 
the United Kingdom and France, followed by Sweden and Germany. In line with the national 
provisions, bank groups headquartered in the United Kingdom consistently report tax paid, 
whereas French bank groups predominantly disclose both current and deferred tax expense. 
Bank groups headquartered in Sweden and Germany have a clear preference for the accounting 
tax expense, i.e. the sum of current and deferred taxes. 
Apart from explanations on the composition of particular variables, such as turnover and 
the number of employees, some CbCRs also provide explanations that help to interpret the 
CbCR data. Almost a fifth (18.09%) of the CbCRs in our sample contain additional explanations 
on for instance extraordinarily high or low numbers or on the relation between different reported 
items (see Figure 11). In the United Kingdom, the guidelines on the Capital Requirements 
Regulations 2013 (Statutory Instrument 2013 No. 3118) which implement Article 89 of the 
CRD IV into national law encourage institutions to provide additional explanations and 
information on a voluntary basis (HM Treasury, 2013a). Indeed, slightly more than half of the 
bank groups headquartered in the United Kingdom (52.50%) follow this recommendation and 
include clarifications in their CbCR. Such qualitative information can be very valuable because 
it can help to prevent misinterpretations. The uninformed reader might be inclined to simply 
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compare reported taxes, profits, turnover and employees and thus draw potentially wrong 
conclusions. A low effective tax rate in terms of reported taxes over reported profits, however, 
is not necessarily driven by aggressive tax planning, but could also result from the utilization 
of existing loss carry-forwards. Similarly, a particularly low profit before tax could arise from 
a special amortization instead of book profit shifting activities (Deutscher Steuerberater-
Verband e.V., 2016, p. 3). The provision of additional narrative information can assist the 
reader in interpreting the data. Still, it remains questionable in how far it is actually considered 
by the addressees of the CbCR besides the actual numbers (Dutt et al., 2020, p. 20). 
The list of variables on which financial institutions have to disclose by-country data 
according to Article 89 of the CRD IV is very limited (see Section 2.1). Financial institutions 
could substantially increase the informative value of their reports by voluntarily publishing data 
on further variables. Figure 15 shows that 7.24% of the CbCRs contain by-country data on 
additional items that are not required by Article 89 of the CRD IV, such as net profit, total 
assets, depreciation, certain expenses or other asset, profit, liability and equity figures (see the 
notes to Figure 16 for further examples). The only headquarter countries where the reporting of 
supplementary items is common, though, are Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark. 
According to Article 89 of the CRD IV, the CbCR data shall be published “by Member 
State and by third country in which it [the institution] has an establishment”. However, some 
bank groups pool several countries into a single entry (in the following denoted as “collective 
country”). A fifth (21.38%) of the CbCRs in our sample contain at least one collective country 
(see Figure 17). Still, there is a wide variety among headquarter countries, with the highest 
share of CbCRs including collective countries observable in Sweden (53.33%) and the lowest 
share observable in Italy (0%). In France, 5.13% of the CbCRs even report three or more 
collective countries, whereas the vast majority does not include any such item. Collective 
countries are mostly summarized under the expression “Rest of the world” and rarely under 
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more specific terms, e.g. “Channel Islands”, “Other EU countries”, “Asia”, “North America” 
or “Other non-EU countries” (see Figure 18). The pooling of several countries comes at the cost 
of transparency. However, the relative importance of collective countries in terms of the number 
of employees and profit before tax is in most cases negligible.18 Bank groups thus do not seem 
to hide their activities in particular countries behind low transparency. Instead, a potential 
reason for the pooling could be that the costs of calculating the data by country would outweigh 
the benefits of disclosing more detailed information. In addition, considerations on the 
confidentiality of the data might play a role. 
There are two simple measures to increase transparency in the CbCRs, as displayed in 
Figure 19. The first is the inclusion of totals for the items, which allows for a better assessment 
of the relative importance of single countries. About two third (68.42%) of the CbCRs include 
item sums across the reported countries. Interestingly, CbCRs of German-based bank groups, 
which perform well in most other dimensions, contain item sums by far the least often. The 
second measure is the reporting of previous-year data. Especially in case of one-time events, 
like a special amortization, the use of a loss carry-forward or restructurings, the comparison 
with data from the previous year can be helpful to the addressees of the CbCR. Previous-year 
data is only included in less than a third (29.28%) of the reports. 
4.1.3. Readability of the CbCR data tables 
The way the CbCR data is structured and presented can support the reader of the report in 
processing the information. Generally, there are no guidelines as regards the design and 
structure of the tables which contain the by-country data, such that institutions are free to choose 
                                                 
18 We calculate the relative importance as the share of the number of employees (profit/ loss before tax) reported 
in collective countries in the total number of employees (profit/ loss before tax). Our calculations are based on the 
original CbCR dataset at bank group-year-country level of Dutt, Nicolay et al. (2019). The average share per bank 
group across the years 2014-2016 ranges from 0% to 4.21% (with only one outlier at 28.15%) in terms of the 
number of employees and from 0% to 8.09% (with only one outlier at 14.24%) in terms of profit/ loss before tax. 
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their preferred style. We examine the readability of the CbCR data tables along several 
dimensions. 
First, as illustrated in Figure 20, there are different ways to sort the jurisdictions on which 
CbCR data is reported. Especially if the group is active in many countries, a sophisticated order 
can guide the reader through the report and helps to find a particular information. Countries are 
mostly (68.00%) sorted by size or importance in terms of at least one of the reportable items, 
such that for instance countries with many employees or a high profit before tax or turnover 
rank first. The primary sorting criterion employed in the remaining CbCRs is either by region/ 
continent or alphabetic, whereby the latter is particularly common in France and Austria. 
Next, we evaluate the reader-friendliness of the tables containing the CbCR data. Figure 
21 shows the share of CbCRs that contain certain measures in order to improve the readability 
of the CbCR data tables. Most bank groups align numbers to the decimal point (91.69% of the 
reports), use monospaced numbers (85.71%) and separate thousands by comma or dot 
(84.39%), which facilitates the processing of the numerical information. A mixed picture arises 
regarding the indication of negative values. Particularly bank groups headquartered in the 
United Kingdom use brackets instead of a minus sign when indicating negative profit, turnover 
or tax figures, which is less intuitive. With regard to the structure of the tables, the majority of 
CbCRs (79.40%) arrange countries in rows and items in columns. In particular if many 
countries are reported, this structure is clearer and makes it easier to compare items and 
countries. We also consider whether additional measures are implemented to improve the 
readability of the data tables, for instance by using a specific layout or design or by grouping 
certain countries for a better overview. Especially CbCRs from bank groups in Spain and Italy 
offer room for improvement in this regard. Only two institutions in our sample (headquartered 
in France and the United Kingdom) additionally provide a visualization of the CbCR data, such 
as bar charts. 
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4.1.4. List of subsidiaries and branches 
Article 89 of the CRD IV prescribes that the name, nature of activities and geographical 
location of the group’s entities are published together with the CbCR data. While 61.84% of 
the CbCRs contain such an entity list, the remaining reports only refer to the list of 
shareholdings in the annual report or even provide no details in the CbCR as to where to find 
the required information (see Figure 22). German-based bank groups exhibit the highest 
transparency, with the majority of CbCRs containing an own entity list. In contrast, 
transparency is lowest in Sweden and Spain. Among those CbCRs that publish the list of entities 
as part of the CbCR, about one third (29.85%) first present the entity list, followed by the CbCR 
core data, whereas about two third (70.15%) first present the CbCR core data, followed by the 
entity list, or combine both parts (see Figure 23). We rank the second alternative higher as the 
numerical CbCR data, which is presumably of higher interest for most of the readers of the 
report, is placed more prominently. Bank groups headquartered in the Netherlands, Spain and 
Sweden consistently choose this ordering. Slightly more than half (54.37%) of the entity lists 
in the CbCR contain both subsidiaries and branches; for Spanish and Swedish institutions, the 
share is highest at 100% (see Figure 24). In 28.64% of the cases, it remains unclear whether 
branches are included or not. Entities are mostly sorted by country or region, which is helpful 
for understanding which activities are behind the CbCR data (see Figure 25). 
4.2 Transparency scores 
In Section 4.1, we have analyzed the reporting heterogeneity in our sample of CbCRs for 
distinct variables. In this section, we aggregate single variables to transparency scores in order 
to identify bank groups and headquarter countries that are particularly (in-)transparent in certain 
dimensions. Our variables are defined in such a way that a higher value implies more 
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transparency or a better readability (see Section 3).19 Therefore, we can add up the values of 
different variables in order to achieve an overall figure which reflects the degree of transparency 
across several variables. We construct three different transparency scores: The content score 
reflects the degree of transparency across the variables that relate to the CbCR content, i.e. the 
provision of additional information that helps to interpret the CbCR data as well as the way of 
calculation of the reportable items in light of the lack of clear guidelines. The readability score 
relates to the way the CbCR data tables are structured and presented. The overall score is 
composed of the content score and of the readability score and also takes into consideration the 
place of publication of both the CbCR and the list of entities. Table 3 provides an overview of 
the variables that are included in each transparency score. The scores are normalized to 100, 
whereby a score of 100 (0) indicates the highest (lowest) possible degree of transparency. In 
the following, we consider both the average score per headquarter country and the average score 
per bank group. The average score per headquarter country is calculated across all available 
CbCRs published by bank groups headquartered in the respective country.20 The average score 
per bank group is calculated across the CbCRs published by the respective bank group over the 
years 2014-2016. 
Figure 26 and Figure 27 show the average content score and readability score per 
headquarter country. CbCRs published by bank groups headquartered in the United Kingdom 
and Germany achieve on average the highest scores with respect to the CbCR content (41.35 
and 38.91 points, respectively), whereas CbCRs published by bank groups headquartered in 
Austria and the Netherlands rank lowest (23.04 and 25.21 points, respectively). The readability 
of the CbCR data tables is best for German bank groups (72.45 points) and worst for Italian 
                                                 
19 The different values that a variable can take are indicated in the last column of Table 3. 
20 We only consider headquarter countries for which at least 15 CbCRs are included in our sample. 
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bank groups (60.52 points); however, the variation among the headquarter countries is very 
low. 
Across all dimensions considered, the CbCRs published by bank groups from the United 
Kingdom and Germany are the most transparent and readable (44.75 and 44.43 points, 
respectively), whereas Austrian bank groups achieve on average the lowest overall scores 
(29.95 points) (see Figure 28). Figure 29 shows the distribution of the overall score in each 
considered headquarter country (i.e. including the median, the 25th percentile, the 75th percentile 
as well as the lower and upper adjacent values). Especially in countries for which the number 
of observations in our sample is comparatively high (i.e. Germany, the United Kingdom, 
France, Italy and Spain, see Table 2), we observe a large heterogeneity among the CbCRs. At 
bank group level, the ranking on the overall score is led by a bank group headquartered in the 
United Kingdom (58.33 points); a French bank group occupies the bottom of the ranking (22.78 
points) (see Figure 30). Still, even for those bank groups that perform best in our analyses, the 
reporting behavior leaves room for improvements (e.g. CbCRs from bank groups in the United 
Kingdom achieve on average an overall score of 44.75 of the maximum 100 points, with the 
leading British bank group achieving 58.33 out of 100 points). 
The degree of transparency in the CbCR affects the interpretability of the report. A 
transparent and comprehensive CbCR can help the reader to gather all relevant information and 
to draw the right conclusions on the group’s activities. Certain bank groups, however, might be 
inclined to hide their activities behind low transparency in order to avoid potentially negative 
consequences from the disclosure, such as reputational damages, competitive disadvantages or 
a higher risk to be audited. Especially bank groups with a high tax haven intensity and large 
bank groups might be prone to such strategic considerations for the following reasons. First, 
tax avoidance strategies regularly include the use of jurisdictions that have low tax rates or 
favorable tax regimes in place. A high share of tax havens in the CbCR is thus likely to attract 
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the attention of the public and of tax authorities. Second, large bank groups have generally more 
opportunities for profit shifting than smaller groups. Again, their CbCRs could be more in the 
focus of different stakeholders than the CbCRs disclosed by smaller groups. On the other hand, 
though, these two types of bank groups might as well be incentivized to prepare CbCRs which 
are particularly transparent in order to avoid possibly wrong conclusions. 
We analyze the relationship between the reporting behavior and both the size of the bank 
group and the intensity of tax haven usage by conducting correlation analyses. We measure the 
size of the group in terms of the total number of employees reported in the CbCR. The intensity 
of tax haven usage is defined as the share of tax havens in the total number of reported countries, 
excluding the headquarter country. We calculate these variables based on the original CbCR 
dataset at bank group-year-country level of Dutt, Nicolay et al. (2019). Table 4 shows the 
pairwise correlation coefficients between the transparency scores, the total number of 
employees and the share of reported tax havens. We find positive correlation coefficients 
(0.207% and 0.194%, respectively) between the overall transparency score and both the total 
number of employees and the share of reported tax havens, which are significant at the 1% 
level. This finding provides evidence that large bank groups and bank groups with a high tax 
haven intensity do not hide their tax haven activities behind low transparency, as conjectured 
above, but proactively disclose their activities in a transparent CbCR. This effect mainly stems 
from the provision of additional information on the CbCR data and from the manner of 
calculation of the reportable items (i.e. the content score), whereas the readability of the tables 
containing the data (i.e. the readability score) is only marginally related to the size of the bank 
group and the share of tax havens. 
Overall, our descriptive analysis reveals that the lack of clear and uniform guidelines as 
regards Article 89 of the CRD IV results in a large heterogeneity in the CbC reporting behavior 
across different bank groups and headquarter countries, which in turn impedes the 
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comparability of the reports and increases the risk of misinterpretations by the public and by 
tax authorities. Given the high direct and indirect costs that go along with the public disclosure 
of by-country data (Dutt et al., 2020), it is essential to ensure that the way of calculating and 
presenting the required information does not reduce the added value of CbCR. 
5 Development of a best practice approach on country-by-country 
reporting 
The imprecise formulations of Article 89 of the CRD IV and the transposing national tax 
laws allow the reporting banks to choose the options that fits their needs best, thus reducing 
their compliance burden (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014a, p. 4). This flexibility, though, comes 
at the cost of transparency. Ultimately, the heterogeneous reporting behavior identified in 
Section 4 runs counter to the primary objective of public CbCR, which should enable the society 
to assess whether the taxes paid in the different jurisdictions reflect real economic activity 
appropriately. In this section, we develop policy recommendations in order to improve the 
interpretability and the readability of CbCRs published by financial institutions. In particular, 
we suggest guidelines that help to ensure a consistent interpretation of the reports across 
different bank groups and countries, thus increasing the information content of CbCR. Our 
considerations are especially relevant with regard to the ongoing discussion on the introduction 
of a public CbCR for all large multinational firms in the EU (European Commission, 2016; 
European Parliament, 2019; Council of the EU, 2019). Unambiguous instructions at EU-level 
are necessary in order to guarantee that the rules are implemented consistently by all Member 
States and that as few points as possible are open to interpretation by the reporting firms. As 
we derive our recommendations from the inconsistencies in reporting identified in Section 4, 
we refer primarily to the CbCR established in Article 89 of the CRD IV. However, many 
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considerations are generalizable to other CbCR initiatives and proposals. We suggest the 
following best practice approach on CbCR. 
CbCRs shall be accessible via the banks’ websites, either in form of a separate document 
or as part of the annual report. In case the CbCR is published in the annual report, the table of 
contents should include the chapter containing the CbCR in order to facilitate finding the CbCR 
data among the other financial and non-financial information in the annual report. We further 
recommend the use of a clear and unified title, e.g. “Country-by-Country Reporting”. 
The CbCR should relate to the consolidation scope of the applicable accounting standards, 
which is regularly broader than the prudential scope of consolidation and allows for a better 
comparison to the consolidated financial statements. Similarly, the CbCR should be based on 
the same accounting standards (e.g. IFRS or local GAAP) as the financial statements 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014a, p. 24). 
A specification of the data source on which the calculation of profit or loss before tax and 
turnover is based is indispensable in order to ensure the comparability of the data across 
different CbCRs and to provide a picture on the group’s activities which is as accurate and 
informative as possible. As shown in Section 4.1.2, both consolidated and single financial 
statements exhibit certain drawbacks. A potential and feasible compromise would be to 
eliminate intra-group transactions between entities in the same country while preserving cross-
border intra-group transactions (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014a, p. 12). This approach should 
be complemented by reconciliation adjustments that quantify the differences between the sum 
of the country profits (turnover) in the CbCR and the group profit (turnover) in the consolidated 
financial statements (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014a, p. 17). However, despite all attempts to 
standardize the CbCR rules, there will be no full comparability of the data across countries as 
long as accounting standards are not harmonized. A more far-reaching approach would 
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therefore be the set-up and definition of harmonized rules with respect to the determination of 
income (Evers et al., 2017, p. 8). 
For a common understanding of the reportable items, it is necessary to establish uniform 
definitions. Ideally, they should be complemented by detailed guidelines on the exact way of 
calculation and should not offer leeway to the firms. The definition of turnover could follow 
the recommendation of the EBA, which stipulates that this item shall be consistent with that in 
the institution’s financial statements. For credit institutions, for instance, the EBA considers 
total net banking income, i.e. “total net income before impairment and operating expenses, but 
including net interest income, net fees and commissions income, net trading income and other 
operating income” as an appropriate measure (EBA, 2014e). The number of employees should 
be calculated as the average over the financial year covered in the CbCR, not at year-end. 
Otherwise, one-time events like restructurings could distort the relation between the number of 
employees and the other items reported in the CbCR that relate to the whole year. In addition, 
the manner in which particular worker groups, such as sub-contractors, interns, apprentices or 
employees on parental leave, should be considered must be stipulated. Alternatively, bank 
groups should be obliged to provide an explanation on the underlying way of calculation. As 
regards tax on profit or loss, we recommend to report both current and deferred tax expense. In 
contrast to taxes paid, including payments for past or future years, current takes adequately 
reflect the country-specific tax burden in a certain year and, in combination with deferred taxes, 
allow for a better comparison to reported profits before tax. 
The pooling of several countries to a single entry, e.g. “Rest of the world”, is likely to 
reduce transparency and should generally not be allowed. A conceivable exception is the case 
where the CbCR data allows to draw conclusions on the profitability of single subsidiaries and 
thus risks to distort competition. Similarly, a pooling might be reasonable if the costs of 
calculating the data by country would outweigh the benefits of disclosing more detailed 
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information. The possibility to pool countries could be tied to thresholds in terms of the size of 
the reported items, such that only data on jurisdictions where the group’s activities are of minor 
importance is aggregated. In any case, the group should specify which countries are pooled. 
We further suggest to provide additional narrative explanations that help to interpret the 
CbCR data, such as on extraordinarily high or low numbers or on obvious disconnects between 
profit before tax, taxes or employees (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014a, p. 17). The provision of 
totals for the items conveys a better idea of the relative importance of single countries and is 
therefore also recommendable. Ideally, all bank groups should use a uniform template for 
reporting – similar to the model template of the OECD with regard to the confidential reporting 
by large multinational firms vis-à-vis the tax authorities (OECD, 2015, pp. 29–30) –, thus 
facilitating comparisons across bank groups. Above all, countries should be arranged in rows 
and items in columns. Bank groups should align numbers to the decimal point, use monospaced 
numbers and separate thousands by comma or dot. A sophisticated layout and design of the data 
tables can improve the reader-friendliness further. The publication of the CbCR in PDF format 
could be complemented by an interactive online tool on the banks’ websites and by an XML or 
CSV spreadsheet, thereby helping the reader to process the information. The list of entities 
should include both subsidiaries and branches and be placed immediately before or after the 
CbCR data. 
Prior literature reveals that the informative value of CbCR could further be strengthened 
by including additional variables that reflect economic activity, such as total assets and staff 
cost (Dutt, Nicolay et al., 2019). In addition, the reporting of specific indicators, for instance 
intra-group license payments, would shed light on the importance of particular profit shifting 
channels (Steinegger, 2016, p. 458). So far, financial institutions can provide by-country data 
on supplementary variables on a voluntary basis only. In this regard, the mandatory disclosure 
of additional items is worth considering. 
37 
 
Finally, whenever a certain provision is open to various interpretations, the reporting 
institutions should explain which option they have chosen or, if feasible and economically 
rational, provide the required information in several ways. Still, the trade-off between high 
transparency and low compliance costs needs to be considered. 
6 Conclusion 
The public CbCR requirement for EU financial institutions is supposed to allow the tax 
authorities and the general public to better assess whether banks are paying their “fair share of 
taxes” on their worldwide activities. However, the lack of clear and uniform definitions and 
guidelines arises in different ways of interpreting the provisions of Article 89 of the CRD IV. 
Generally, Member States’ national laws do not close these regulatory loopholes and offer 
leeway to the reporting firms. Consequently, the way of preparing and presenting the required 
information differs widely across bank groups, which impedes the interpretability and the 
comparability of the reports. Ultimately, the inconsistent and heterogeneous reporting behavior 
is likely to diminish the informative value of CbCR. 
Based on a sample of CbCRs published by EU-headquartered multinational bank groups 
for financial years 2014-2016, we define and manually code variables that reflect the reporting 
behavior and the degree of transparency in the reports. We analyze how transparently and 
comprehensively the information is presented across different CbCRs and headquarter 
countries and which open points inhibit the interpretability and the readability of the data. 
Finally, we derive recommendations in order to increase the information content of CbCR. 
Our descriptive analysis reveals a heterogeneous reporting behavior across bank groups in 
terms of the place of publication of the report (e.g. annual report vs. separate document), its 
content – such as the underlying data source (e.g. single vs. consolidated financial statements 
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and treatment of intra-group transactions), applied definitions (e.g. consolidated basis, turnover, 
number of employees and tax on profit or loss) and the provision of additional information (e.g. 
explanations, additional items, item totals and previous-year data) –, the readability of the data 
tables (e.g. table structure and design) and the list of entities that should be published together 
with the by-country data (e.g. inclusion in CbCR and consideration of branches). We aggregate 
single variables to transparency scores and identify bank groups and headquarter countries that 
are particularly (in-)transparent in certain dimensions. We find that CbCRs published by bank 
groups from the United Kingdom and Germany are the most transparent and readable, whereas 
the Austrian bank groups in our sample achieve on average the lowest overall scores. We also 
observe that large bank groups and bank groups with a high share of tax havens prepare CbCRs 
which are comparatively transparent. In order to ensure a consistent interpretation of the reports, 
we recommend to specify the underlying data source and the applicable consolidation scope 
and to establish uniform definitions of the reportable items which should apply to all groups 
preparing a report. A standardized template, comparable to the model template of the OECD 
(OECD, 2015, pp. 29–30), would further help to process the information and would allow for 
better comparisons across bank groups. 
Our findings are relevant for researchers, policymakers and the addressees of public CbCR, 
notably tax authorities and the general public. We make an important contribution by showing 
which considerations should be made when analyzing and interpreting CbCR data. The lack of 
standardized rules becomes especially noticeable when several reports prepared by different 
bank groups are considered simultaneously. Thus, empirical analyses of the CbCR data would 
substantially gain in meaningfulness if a uniform CbCR approach was adopted as the 
comparability of the underlying data would considerably improve. Our analyses are particularly 
important in view of the current CbCR proposal for large EU multinationals which is still under 
discussion (European Commission, 2016; European Parliament, 2019; Council of the EU, 
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2019). Given the high direct and indirect costs that go along with the disclosure requirement 
(Dutt et al., 2020), it has to be ensured that different ways of calculating and presenting the 
information do not weaken the added value of CbCR. Since the data shall be disclosed publicly, 
the prevention of misinterpretations becomes even more a concern than in case of a purely 
confidential CbCR vis-à-vis the tax authorities. Therefore, clear guidelines for preparing the 
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Figure 1: Publication of CbCR in (separate chapter of) annual report 
 
Notes: The graph shows the share of CbCRs that are published in the annual report (“Publication of CbCR in 
annual report”) and, for those CbCRs that are published in the annual report, the share of CbCRs that are contained 
in a separate chapter of the annual report, i.e. the CbCR is included in the table of contents of the annual report 
(“Publication of CbCR in separate chapter of annual report”). 
 
Figure 2: Form of publication used for CbCR apart from annual report 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of the forms of publication used for the CbCR apart from the 
annual report. “No separate CbCR document” indicates that the CbCR is only published in the annual report, 
without any separate publication being detectable. “Separate CbCR document” indicates that the CbCR is 
published in a separate document which contains no other information – regardless of a parallel publication in the 
annual report. “CbCR information as part of a larger tax report” represents a specific scenario where the CbCR 
information is published as part of a larger tax report which includes additional information.  
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Figure 3: Use of literal expression of “CbCR” or equivalent terms 
 
Notes: The graph shows the share of CbCRs that include the literal expression of “CbCR” or equivalent terms 
(accounting for different languages). “No” indicates that the literal expression or an equivalent term for CbCR is 
not used in the report. “Yes” indicates that the literal expression or an equivalent term for CbCR is used in the 
report. 
 
Figure 4: Explanation on legal basis of CbCR 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of the different explanations given on the legal basis of the CbCR. 
“No reference” indicates that no explanation is given on the legal basis. The other possible cases include a 






Figure 5: Underlying consolidation scope 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of the underlying consolidation scopes used. “No information 
given” indicates that no information on the underlying consolidation scope is provided in the CbCR. “Only 
statement that ’consolidated entities’ are included” denotes the statement in the CbCR that only consolidated 
entities are included. “Prudential scope of consolidation” and “Group financial accounts consolidation scope” 
indicate that the CbCR states that the prudential consolidation scope and the group financial accounts consolidation 
scope are used, respectively. 
 
Figure 6: Underlying data source for profit before tax and turnover 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of the underlying data sources used for the by-country calculation 
of profit before tax and turnover. “No information given” indicates that no information on the underlying data 
source is provided in the CbCR. “Single financial statements” and “Consolidated financial statements” indicate 
that the CbCR states that single financial statements and consolidated financial statements, respectively, are used 




Figure 7: Underlying treatment of intra-group transactions with regard to the 
calculation of profit before tax and turnover 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of the ways intra-group transactions are treated with regard to the 
calculation of profit before tax and turnover. “No information given” indicates that no information on the 
underlying treatment of intra-group transactions is provided in the CbCR. “No elimination of intra-group 
transactions”, “Elimination of all intra-group transactions” and “Elimination only of transactions between entities 
in the same country” indicate that the CbCR states that intra-group transactions are not eliminated, that all intra-
group transactions are eliminated and that only transactions between different entities in the same country are 





Figure 8: Degree of compatibility between CbCR and consolidated financial statements 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of the different degrees to which the CbCR and the consolidated 
financial statements are compatible. “No information given” indicates that no information on the compatibility 
between the CbCR and the consolidated financial statements is provided in the CbCR. “Statement that 
reconciliation is not possible”, “Statement that CbCR data and consolidated financial statements are compatible” 
and “Differences between CbCR data and consolidated financial statements quantified” indicate that the CbCR 
states that reconciliation between the CbCR data and the consolidated financial statements is not possible, that 
compatibility between the CbCR data and the consolidated financial statements is given and that differences 





Figure 9: Expressions used for turnover 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of different expressions used for the reporting of turnover in the 
CbCR (notwithstanding differences in language and spelling). “Reporting of turnover” refers to the cases where 
turnover is literally reported as “turnover”, i.e. turnover, fatturato, Umsatz, chiffre d’affaires. “Reporting of (total) 
operating income” refers to the reporting of (total / statutory / other) operating income, total income from operating 
activities, Betriebserträge. “Reporting of (sales / net) revenue(s)” refers to the reporting of (sales / net) revenue(s). 
“Reporting of (total / gross) income / margin” refers to the reporting of (total / gross) income / margin, margen 
bruto, income from continued / continuing operations. “Reporting of net banking income” refers to the reporting 
of net banking income / revenue, produit net bancaire, net interest and other banking income. “Reporting of 
business volume” refers to the reporting of business volume, volume of business, volumen de negocio. “Reporting 
of net interest income” refers to the reporting of net interest income, Zinsüberschuss, Nettozinsertrag, both interest 
income and interest expense. “Reporting of other turnover items” refers to the reporting of other variables in the 






Figure 10: Number of turnover variables reported 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of the number of reported turnover variables. “Reporting of one 
turnover variable”, “Reporting of two turnover variables” and “Reporting of three or more turnover variables” 
refer to the reporting of one, two and three or more turnover variables, respectively, in the CbCR. 
 
Figure 11: Provision of additional explanations 
 
Notes: The graph shows the share of CbCRs that provide additional explanations. “Additional explanation on 
CbCR data” refers to explanations that help to interpret the CbCR data, such as explanations on extraordinarily 
high or low numbers or on the relation between different reported items. “Additional explanation on composition 
of turnover” refers to additional explanations on the notion of turnover or on the sub-items which are included in 
this variable. “Additional explanation on calculation of number of employees” refers to additional explanations on 
the calculation of the number of employees, whereby only information that goes beyond information as to whether 





Figure 12: Manner of calculating number of employees 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of different manners of calculating the number of employees in 
the CbCR. “No information given” indicates that no information as to whether the number of employees refers to 
an average over time or to a specific point in time is provided in the CbCR. “Reporting of number of employees 
at year-end / reporting date” and “Reporting of average number of employees” indicate that the number of 
employees at year-end or at the reporting date and the average number of employees, respectively, are considered 
when calculating the number of employees. “Reporting of average and year-end number of employees” indicates 
that both the average and the year-end number of employees are considered. 
 
Figure 13: Number of tax variables reported 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of the number of reported tax variables. “Reporting of no tax 
variable”, “Reporting of one tax variable”, “Reporting of two tax variables”, “Reporting of three tax variables” 
and “Reporting of four or more tax variables” refer to the reporting of no, one, two, three and four or more tax 




Figure 14: Tax variables reported 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of different tax variables reported in the CbCR. The observed 
reported tax variables include “tax item of which the exact meaning is unclear” (e.g. only labelled “tax(es)”), “sum 
of current and deferred tax expense”, “tax paid”, “current tax expense” and “deferred tax expense”. 
 
Figure 15: Number of additionally reported items beyond required CbCR items 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of the number of additionally reported items that go beyond the 
requirements of CbCR. “Reporting of no additional item”, “Reporting of one additional item”, “Reporting of two 
additional items” and “Reporting of three or more additional items” refer to the reporting of no, one, two and three 





Figure 16: Additionally reported items beyond required CbCR items 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of additionally reported items that go beyond the requirements of 
CbCR. The observed additionally reported items include “net profit”, “total assets”, “depreciation / amortisation / 
impairments”, “expenses” (e.g. staff cost, operating expenses, administrative expenses, other expenses), “other 
asset items” (e.g. investments, cash, loans, bonds, financial assets, intangible and tangible fixed assets), “other 
profit items” (e.g. earnings before credit losses, net credit losses, profit before impairments), “liability items” (e.g. 
deposits and borrowings, financial liabilities, total liabilities) and “equity items” (e.g. allocated equity, non-
controlling interests). 
 
Figure 17: Number of collective countries reported 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of the number of reported collective countries. “Reporting of no 
collective country”, “Reporting of one collective country”, “Reporting of two collective countries” and “Reporting 
of three or more collective countries” refer to the reporting of no, one, two and three or more collective countries, 




Figure 18: Different groupings of countries 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of different groupings of countries (notwithstanding differences 
in language and spelling) in the CbCR. The observed reported groupings of countries include “Rest of the world”, 
“Channel Islands”, “Other EU countries”, “Asia”, “North America”, “Other non-EU countries” and other 
collective countries (e.g. Latin America, Asia-Pacific and Latin America, Oceania). 
 
Figure 19: Provision of totals for items and data of previous year 
 
Notes: The graph shows the share of CbCRs that provide totals for the items (“Provision of totals for items”) and 





Figure 20: Primary sorting criterion for countries 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of different primary sorting criteria for the countries in the CbCR. 
“No apparent criterion” indicates that no apparent primary sorting criterion for the countries is provided in the 
CbCR. “Region / continent”, “Alphabetic” and “Size / importance” indicate that the region or continent, the 
alphabetic order and the size or importance (i.e. in terms of at least one of the reportable items) of the countries, 
respectively, are considered as the primary sorting criterion for the countries reported in the CbCR. 
 
Figure 21: Readability of CbCR data table 
 
Notes: The graph shows the share of CbCRs that contain various measures in order to improve the readability of 
the data table(s). These measures include “Alignment of numbers to decimal point”, “Monospacing of numbers”, 
“Separation of thousands by comma or dot” (depending on the language), “Arrangement of countries in rows and 
items in columns”, “Reader-friendly table design” (e.g. using a specific layout or design or grouping certain 
countries for a better overview), “Indication of negative values with minus (not with brackets)” (i.e. “-“ instead of 
“( )”), and “Visualization of CbCR data”.  
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Figure 22: Place of publication of list of entities 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of different forms of publication of the list of subsidiaries and 
branches. “No information given” indicates that no information on the list of entities is provided in the CbCR. 
“CbCR only refers to list of shareholdings in annual report” indicates that the CbCR only refers to the list of 
shareholdings in the annual report. “CbCR contains separate list” indicates that the CbCR contains a separate list 
of entities. 
 
Figure 23: Overall structure of CbCR 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of different overall structures of the CbCR. “1) List of entities, 2) 
Core data” refers to the structure where the first part of the CbCR consists of the list of entities while the second 
part contains the core data. “1) Core data, 2) List of entities; or both combined” refers to the structure where the 
first part of the CbCR consists of the core data while the second part contains the list of entities or where both parts 





Figure 24: Information regarding foreign branches 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of different degrees of inclusion of foreign branches in the list of 
entities provided in the CbCR. Entity lists in the annual report to which the CbCR refers, but which are not part of 
the CbCR, are not considered. “Unclear” indicates that it is not clear whether the list of entities includes branches. 
“List contains only subsidiaries” and “List contains both subsidiaries and foreign branches” indicate that the list 
of entities provided in the CbCR contains only subsidiaries and that it contains both subsidiaries and foreign 
branches, respectively. 
 
Figure 25: Sorting criteria for list of entities in CbCR 
 
Notes: The graph shows the relative frequencies of different sorting criteria for the list of entities in the CbCR. 
Entity lists in the annual report to which the CbCR refers, but which are not part of the CbCR, are not considered. 
“No apparent criterion” indicates that no apparent sorting criterion for the list of entities is provided in the CbCR. 
“At least one sorting criterion, but restricted usefulness”, “Country / region as 1st criterion, any 2nd criterion other 
than alphabetic” and “Country / region as 1st criterion and alphabetic as 2nd criterion” refer to different sorting 




Figure 26: Content score – by headquarter country 
 
Notes: The graph shows the average score on the CbCR content for a selection of headquarter countries. The score 
includes the variables cbcr_term, legal, acc_std, cons_scope, data_source_plbt, data_source_turn, 
cons_intra_plbt, cons_intra_turn, recon_ar, turn_count, turn_expl, empl_date, empl_add, tax_count, tax_expl, 
expl_add, subs_ctry, item_add_count, other_ctry_count_desc, items_total, items_prevyear and unit_orig (see 
Table 3 for a description of the variables). It is normalized to 100, whereby a score of 100 (0) indicates the highest 
(lowest) possible degree of transparency. The average score per headquarter country is calculated across all 
available CbCRs published by bank groups headquartered in the respective country. 
 
Figure 27: Readability score – by headquarter country 
 
Notes: The graph shows the average score on the readability of the CbCR data table(s) for a selection of 
headquarter countries. The score includes the variables num_aligned, num_monospaced, num_thousands, 
num_negative, table_layout, table_design and visual (see Table 3 for a description of the variables). It is 
normalized to 100, whereby a score of 100 (0) indicates the highest (lowest) possible degree of transparency. The 
average score per headquarter country is calculated across all available CbCRs published by bank groups 
headquartered in the respective country.  
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Figure 28: Overall score – by headquarter country 
 
Notes: The graph shows the average overall score for a selection of headquarter countries. The overall score is 
composed of the content score and of the readability score and also takes into consideration the place of publication 
of both the CbCR and the list of entities (see Table 3 for a description of the variables). It is normalized to 100, 
whereby a score of 100 (0) indicates the highest (lowest) possible degree of transparency. The average score per 
headquarter country is calculated across all available CbCRs published by bank groups headquartered in the 
respective country. 
 
Figure 29: Overall score – box plot by headquarter country 
 
Notes: The graph shows the distribution (median, 25th percentile, 75th percentile, lower and upper adjacent values) 
of the overall score for a selection of headquarter countries. The overall score is composed of the content score 
and of the readability score and also takes into consideration the place of publication of both the CbCR and the list 
of entities (see Table 3 for a description of the variables). It is normalized to 100, whereby a score of 100 (0) 
indicates the highest (lowest) possible degree of transparency. The distribution of the score per headquarter country 
is calculated across all available CbCRs published by bank groups headquartered in the respective country. Outside 
values are not plotted.  
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Figure 30: Overall score – average across years for selected bank groups 
 
Notes: The graph shows the average overall score for selected bank groups. The overall score is composed of the 
content score and of the readability score and also takes into consideration the place of publication of both the 
CbCR and the list of entities (see Table 3 for a description of the variables). It is normalized to 100, whereby a 
score of 100 (0) indicates the highest (lowest) possible degree of transparency. The average score per bank group 
is calculated across the years 2014-2016. The selection of bank groups includes the 20 largest bank groups in terms 
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Table 1: Transposition of Article 89 of the CRD IV into the national laws of selected EU Member States and recommendations by the 
European Banking Authority 
Item / Topic European Banking 
Authority 
France Germany Italy United Kingdom 
Publication Annex or notes to financial 
statements or separate report 
Annual report, annex to 
financial statements or 
separate document on 
website; list of entities and 
table containing key 
financials shall be presented 
one after the other in the 
document where they are 
published 
- Annex to financial statements 
or website in combination 
with link in financial 
statements 
Annual report or website in 
combination with link in annual 
report 






- Accounting consolidation 
scope, but only for firms within 
scope of CRD IV 
Treatment of intra-group 
transactions 
Before adjustments for intra-
group cross-border 
transactions and other 
consolidated adjustments 
- Gross basis; institutions can 
decide whether they want to 
consolidate intra-group 
transactions within countries 
- - 
Turnover Consistent with the 
institution’s financial 
statements, e.g. total net 
banking income (i.e. total net 
income before impairment 
and operating expenses, but 
including net interest income, 
net fees and commissions 
income, net trading income 
and other operating income) 
"Produit net bancaire" (net 
banking income); "chiffre 
d'affaires" (turnover) 
Total net income before 
impairment and operating 
expenses, but including net 
interest income, net fees and 
commissions income, net 
trading income and other 
operating income 
Net interest and other 
banking income as per item 
120 of the income statement 
and the consolidated income 
statement 
Consistent with the institution’s 
financial statements; e.g. total 
income before impairment and 
operating expenses, but after 
net interest, net 
commissions/fees income, 
investment and trading income 




Item / Topic European Banking 
Authority 
France Germany Italy United Kingdom 
Number of employees on a 
full-time equivalent basis 
- - In line with § 267 Sec. 5 
HGB: average, without 
employees in training 
Ratio between the total 
number of hours worked by 
all employees, excluding 
overtime, and the 
contractually agreed annual 
total for a full-time employee 
Average; no requirement to 
report on workers who are not 
employees 
Profit or loss before tax - - - Sum of items 250 and 280 
(the latter before tax) of the 
income statement 
Consistent with the institution’s 
financial statements 
Tax on profit or loss Separately on a cash basis 
(taxes paid) and on an 
accrued basis (only current 
tax expense, no deferred 
taxes or provisions for 
uncertain tax liabilities) 
Current and deferred tax 
expense 
Accounting tax expense Sum of the taxes referred to 
in item 260 of the income 
statement and income taxes 
relating to groups of assets 
held for sale 
Corporation tax paid 
Other Institutions shall reconcile the 
published information with 
the consolidated annual 
financial statements where 
applicable 
- - - Institutions are encouraged to 
provide additional explanations 
and information that might be 
considered helpful to readers 
Source EBA (2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 
2014d, 2014e) 
Art. L511-45 Code monétaire 
et financier; Décret n° 2014-
1657 du 29 décembre 2014 
pris pour l'application de 
l'article L511-45 du code 
monétaire et financier 
BaFin (2015) Circolare n. 285 del 17 
dicembre 2013, Parte Prima, 
Titolo III, Capitolo 2 
Statutory Instrument 2013 
No. 3118; HM Treasury 
(2013a, 2013b) 
Notes: The table shows how different aspects of Article 89 of the CRD IV are transposed into the national laws of selected Member States, including clarifications provided by 
the European Banking Authority. The selection of Member States is based on countries for which at least 15 CbCRs are included in our sample and where national laws and 




Table 2: CbCR sample composition – Headquarter countries 
Headquarter country 2014 2015 2016 Total 
Austria 5 6 6 17 
Belgium 3 3 4 10 
Cyprus 1 2 2 5 
Denmark 3 3 3 9 
France 12 14 13 39 
Germany 19 19 18 56 
Greece 2 2 2 6 
Ireland 1 1 1 3 
Italy 12 15 12 39 
Luxembourg 0 2 3 5 
Netherlands 6 7 7 20 
Poland 0 0 1 1 
Portugal 0 1 1 2 
Slovenia 1 1 1 3 
Spain 11 12 11 34 
Sweden 5 5 5 15 
United Kingdom 10 16 14 40 
Total 91 109 104 304 





Table 3: List of variables and transparency scores 
Scores 
Variables 
Name Description Values 
Overall score Content score 




legal Explanation on legal basis of CbCR 0: No reference 
1: Reference only to national legal rules 
2: Reference only to CRD IV 
3: Reference to both national rules and CRD IV 
acc_std Underlying accounting standards 0: No information given 
1: Local GAAP 
2: IFRS 
cons_scope Underlying consolidation scope 0: No information given 
1: Only statement that 'consolidated entities' are included 
2: Prudential scope of consolidation 
3: Group financial accounts consolidation scope 
data_source_plbt Underlying data source for profit before tax 0: No information given 
1: Single financial statements 
2: Consolidated financial statements 
data_source_turn Underlying data source for turnover 0: No information given 
1: Single financial statements 
2: Consolidated financial statements 
cons_intra_plbt Underlying treatment of intra-group 
transactions with regard to the calculation of 
profit before tax 
0: No information given 
1: No elimination of intra-group transactions 
2: Elimination of all intra-group transactions 







Name Description Values 
Overall score Content score 
cons_intra_turn Underlying treatment of intra-group 
transactions with regard to the calculation of 
turnover 
0: No information given 
1: No elimination of intra-group transactions 
2: Elimination of all intra-group transactions 
3: Elimination only of transactions between entities in the 
same country 
recon_ar Degree of compatibility between CbCR and 
consolidated financial statements 
0: No information given 
1: Statement that reconciliation is not possible 
2: Statement that CbCR data and consolidated financial 
statements are compatible 
3: Differences between CbCR data and consolidated 
financial statements quantified 
turn_count Number of turnover variables reported 0: Reporting of one turnover variable 
1: Reporting of two turnover variables 
2: Reporting of three or more turnover variables 
turn_expl Provision of additional explanation on 
composition of turnover 
0: No 
1: Yes 
empl_date Manner of calculating number of employees 0: No information given 
1: Reporting of number of employees at year-end/ 
reporting date 
2: Reporting of average number of employees 
3: Reporting of average and year-end number of 
employees 
empl_add Provision of additional explanation on 
calculation of number of employees 
0: No 
1: Yes 
tax_count Number of tax variables reported 0: Reporting of no tax variable 
1: Reporting of one tax variable 
2: Reporting of two tax variables 
3: Reporting of three tax variables 






Name Description Values 
Overall score Content score 
tax_expl Definition of all income tax items 0: No additional explanation 
1: Indirect explanation on all income tax items 
2: Explicit explanation on all income tax items 




subs_ctry Provision of data on public subsidies 
received on by-country basis 
0: No 
1: Yes 
item_add_count Number of additionally reported items 
beyond required CbCR items 
0: Reporting of no additional item 
1: Reporting of one additional item 
2: Reporting of two additional items 
3: Reporting of three or more additional items 
other_ctry_count_desc Number of collective countries reported 
(descending order) 
0: Reporting of three or more collective countries 
1: Reporting of two collective countries 
2: Reporting of one collective country 
3: Reporting of no collective country 
items_total Provision of totals for items 0: No 
1: Yes 
items_prevyear Provision of data of previous year 0: No 
1: Yes 














num_aligned Alignment of numbers to decimal point 0: No 
1: Yes 
num_monospaced Monospacing of numbers 0: No 
1: Yes 
num_thousands Separation of thousands by comma or dot 0: No 
1: Yes 
num_negative Indication of negative values 0: With brackets 
1: With minus 




table_design Reader-friendly table design 0: No 
1: Yes 






publ_ar Publication of CbCR in annual report 0: No 
1: Yes 
publ_sep Publication of CbCR in separate document 0: No separate CbCR document 
1: Separate CbCR document 
2: CbCR information as part of a larger tax report 
list_sep Place of publication of list of entities 0: No information given 
1: CbCR only refers to list of shareholdings in annual 
report 






Name Description Values 
Additional variables not 
included in score analysis 
 
(Reason: Variable values do not 
imply an increase in 
transparency or variables are 
only applicable to a sub-sample 
of CbCRs.) 




turn_variables Expressions used for turnover Free text 
tax_variables Tax variables reported Free text 
item_add_variables Additionally reported items beyond required 
CbCR items 
Free text 
other_ctry_variables Different groupings of countries Free text 
countries_sort Primary sorting criterion for countries 0: No apparent criterion 
1: Region/ continent 
2: Alphabetic 
3: Size/ importance 
list_order Overall structure of CbCR 0: 1) List of entities, 2) Core data 
1: 1) Core data, 2) List of entities; or both combined 
list_branch Information regarding foreign branches 0: Unclear 
1: List contains only subsidiaries 
2: List contains both subsidiaries and foreign branches 
entities_sort Sorting criteria for list of entities in CbCR 0: No apparent criterion 
1: At least one sorting criterion, but restricted usefulness 
2: Country / region as 1st criterion, any 2nd criterion other 
than alphabetic 
3: Country / region as 1st criterion and alphabetic as 2nd 
criterion 






Table 4: Pairwise correlation coefficients between transparency scores, total number of 





score_read empl_sum th_share 
score_overall 1.000     
score_content 0.970*** 1.000    
score_read 0.325*** 0.135** 1.000   
empl_sum 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.054 1.000  
th_share 0.194*** 0.179*** 0.123** -0.143** 1.000 
N 304     
Notes: The table shows the pairwise correlation coefficients between the transparency scores, the total number of 
employees and the share of reported tax havens. score_overall, score_content and score_read denote the overall 
score, the content score and the readability score, respectively (see Table 3 for a description of the variables 
included in the scores). empl_sum denotes the total number of employees reported in the CbCR and is used as 
proxy for the size of the bank group. th_share denotes the share of tax havens in the total number of countries 
reported in the CbCR, excluding the headquarter country. Tax havens are defined according to Hines (2010). 
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